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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3177 
___________ 
 
DOREEN ERNANDEZ, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MERRILL LYNCH 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-05614) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 29, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 12, 2011 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Doreen Ernandez appeals an order of the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  We will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.
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I. 
 In October 2010, Ernandez filed a Title VII employment discrimination complaint 
in the District Court.  Ernandez, who was employed by Merrill Lynch as a Financial 
Advisor from February 2001 until July 2002, alleged that she was terminated from the 
company because of her race.  Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The 
District Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Ernandez failed to timely 
exhaust her administrative remedies.  The Court declined to grant Ernandez leave to 
amend the complaint on the ground of futility.  Ernandez appeals. 
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, and review the District 
Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  Dique v. New 
Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 A plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim under Title VII must 
exhaust his or her administrative remedies by complying with the procedural 
requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.  Those requirements include filing a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or, if the plaintiff initially instituted 
proceedings with a state agency, within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose, 251 
F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2001).   
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 Because Ernandez did not file her charge with the EEOC until July 22, 2010, 
approximately eight years after the limitations period had started, we agree with the 
District Court that her charge was untimely filed.  Although EEOC procedural 
requirements are subject to equitable tolling, see Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 
384 (3d Cir. 2007) and Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997);
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Ernandez did not allege any facts supporting equitable tolling in her complaint, nor did 
she in her response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  On appeal, Ernandez does not 
argue that the District Court erred in determining that she failed to timely pursue her 
administrative remedies with the EEOC, or that amendment of her complaint would be 
futile.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 As we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of Ernandez’s complaint for 
failure to exhaust was proper and agree that, under these circumstances, amendment of 
her complaint would be futile, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
                                              
1
 A court will excuse a plaintiff’s failure to follow EEOC deadlines: “(1) where the 
defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) 
where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or 
her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the 
wrong forum.”  See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
